In the U.S., individual states enact Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) for renewable electricity production with little coordination. A distinctive feature of RPS policies is their flexibility. Most implementations allow LSEs to meet their renewable targets through ownership of an equivalent number of Renewable Energy Credits (RECs), which are financial instruments that represent the environmental attributes of electricity generated using renewable energy technologies. The trading eligibility of the RECs from out-of-state LSEs varies from one state to another.
entities to meet 100% of the renewable targets using out-of-state unbundled RECs are approximately $4.3 billion per year, compared to the situation in which no out-of-state RECs are allowed. These cost savings correspond to a 13.4% reduction in annualized cost of generation operations and new investment in generation and transmission. Remarkably, 90% of these economic gains can be captured by increasing the allowed unbundled REC imports from 0% to just 25%, assuming that trade is restricted to either 1 westwide zone, or 2 or 3 subregions of WECC. Increasing trading flexibility beyond 25% yields additional, but much more modest, cost reductions. This trend is mirrored in the distribution of investment among different renewable energy technologies, which tends to stabilize together with total system cost once the in-state constraint is expanded beyond 25%.
However, much fewer of these benefits from importing unbundled RECs are achieved if myopically tight restrictions are placed on the geographic regions from which imports can come, similar to restrictions some states now have in place. When the west is divided into four regions, and unbundled REC imports are restricted to within each region, about $0.7 billion are lost (when considering the case of 100% unbundled REC trading flexibility). This is because, under a 4-Region scenario, the state of California would not be able to import RECs generated using relatively inexpensive renewable resources located in states like Utah and New Mexico. Thus restrictions on overall REC imports as well as the sources of those imports are both important.
We also find that increasing unbundled REC trading flexibility does not necessarily result in either higher transmission investment costs or a substantial impact on CO 2 emissions. Finally, increasing REC trading flexibility decreases energy prices in some states and increases them elsewhere, while the WECCwide average energy price decreases.
